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Behavioral Sciences and the Law, Vol. 14, 61-81 (1996)

''Dignity was the First to
Leave":* Godinez v. Moran,
Colin Ferguson, and the Trial of
Mentally Disabled Criminal
Defendants
Michael L. Perlin, J.D.
This article considers the Colin Ferguson trial in the
context of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Godinez v. Moran, establishing a unitary standard for the
determinations of competence to stand trial, competence
to plead guilty, and competence to waive counsel. The
Ferguson trial was widely seen as a "charade." I argue that
the Ferguson spectacle was the inevitable denouement of
the Godinez decision. I then look at the Ferguson trial
(through contemporaneous press and television coverage)
under the filters of "sanism" and "pretextuality." I
conclude that the "dignity" value-a prerequisite for a
constitutionally-acceptable fair trial-was, as a result of
Godinez, lacking in the Ferguson case.

I. INTRODUCTION
The public and the media rarely show interest in Supreme Court decisions in
mental disability law cases. Both are intensely interested in cases involving famous
litigants in which mental disability is an issue Gohn Hinckley being the most
celebrated case, and Susan Smith serving as a more recent example) or in which an
individual mentally disabled person's case is seen as somehow emblematic of a
flawed social policy (the sagas of Larry Hogue, and before that, Billie Boggs, known
also as Joyce Brown, on the Upper West Side of New York City being two
provocative examples). 1 If the Supreme Court were to decide, for instance, that
involuntary civil commitment was unconstitutional (which it will never do) or that
/

*From Bob Dylan, Dignity (c. 1995).
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Tomkins, and Karen Gross for their comments on an earlier draft, the participants of the New York Law .
School Tuesday Faculty Lunch Series (especially Steve Ellmann, Gene Cerruti, Randy Jonakait and
Richard Sherwin) for their thoughtful ideas, and Jim Lyons of Court TV for allowing me access to
videotapes of the Colin Ferguson trial. Unless otherwise noted, all cited newspaper articles are available
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1
See e.g., In re Boggs, 522 N.Y.S. 2d 407 (Sup.), rev'd, 523 N.Y.S. 2d 71 (App. Div. 1987); Seltzer v.
Hogue, 594 N .Y.S. 2d 781 (App. Div. 1993).
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the use of the insanity defense was unconstitutional (which it can never do), such
stories might conceivably be the lead articles on the front page of the New York
Times or the Washington Post. But other cases generally pass with little attention,
unless (as in the zoning cases of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 2 or the
more-recent City of Edmonds v. Oxford House 3) there are wide implications beyond
the narrower world of mental disability law.
And so it was when the Supreme Court decided Godinez v. Moran in the spring of
1993. 4 The Supreme Court has, for over a decade, been fascinated with the
interplay between mental disability and the criminal trial process. 5 It has issued a
lengthy series of decisions dealing with such issues as the privilege against self-incrimination, the interplay between competency and the death penalty, the right of
~ insanity defendant to refuse the imposition of antipsychotic medications during
trial, the application of the right to refuse treatment to convicted prisoners, the
constitutionality of state laws allowing for the continued retention of insanity
acquittees who are no longer mentally ill, the constitutionality of state laws allowing
(or the retention of insanity acquittees for longer periods of time than the maximum
to which they could have been sentenced had they been convicted of the underlying
.charges, the allocation of the burden of proof in a competency to stand trial
proceeding, and more. 6 Few drew much attention (except perhaps for those
involving insanity acquittees, and there the attention was primarily collateral to the
facts of the Hinckley case). And Godinez was another in this series.
In Godinez, the Supreme Court, per Justice Thomas and over an impassioned
dissent by Justice Blackmun, held that the standard for determining a defendant's
competency to plead guilty or to waive counsel was the same as the standard
employed to determine his competency to stand trial. 7 The decision reversed a
Ninth Circuit finding that the former inquiries were to be more searching and that
they obligated the trial judge to determine whether the defendant had the capacity
for "reasoned choice" among the alternatives offered to him, a capacity that would
require "a higher level of mental functioning than that required to stand trial. " 8 A
unitary competency finding in criminal cases was all that was constitutionally
required, the Supreme Court ruled, concluding that there was "no basis for
demanding a higher level of competence" for defendants who chose to plead guilty
or waive counsel. 9

2

473 U.S. 432 (1985) (striking down restrictive zoning ordinance).
115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995) (municipal zoning code's definition of a "family" not a maximum occupancy
restriction exempt from Federal Fair Housing Act Amendments banning discrimination against disabled
persons).
4
113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993).
5
See generally Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and
Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or Doctrinal Abyss? 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1987).
6
See, respectively, Estelle v. Smith, 45i U .S. 454 (1981); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992); Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992); Jones v. United States, 463
U.S. 354(1983); Medina v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2572 (1992) . See generally MICHAEL L. PERuN, LAw
AND MENTAL DISABillTY ch. 4 (1994).
7
Godinez, 113 S.Ct. at 2686. See generally 3 MICHAEL L. PERuN, MENTAL DISABIUTY LAw: Crvn. AND
CRIMINAL (1989), §§14.20A-14.21 (1995 Supp.).
8
Moran v. Godinez, 972 F. 2d 263, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993).
9
Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2686.
3
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At the time, Godinez was seen as yet another Supreme Court criminal procedure
victory for prosecutors, and as a means of insuring both more convictions and fewer
appellate reversals of convictions. If all that was required was a finding that the
defendant could meet the incompetency to stand trial test of Dusky v. United States
(that the defendant had a "rational understanding of the proceedings"), 10 then it
would be likely that more mentally ill-but-legally-competent defendants would
plead guilty and would waive counsel. In both instances, more convictionsconvictions now nearly impervious (on these grounds, at least) on appeal-would
flow.
Godinez has inspired surprisingly little critical commentary. A few student notes
critiqued it (though-others praised it); a piece by forensic psychiatrist Alan Felthous
carefully analyzed it, and found it wanting. 11 Yet, compared to the outpouring of
commentary that followed the decisions in Riggins v. Nevada (on the right of the
insanity pleader to refuse medication at trial) 12 or Foucha v. Louisiana (on the
constitutionality of statutes allowing the continued retention of no-longer-mentallyill insanity acquittees), 13 the decision virtually passed without notice. 14
This, in retrospect, should probably not have been surprising. The public's
obsession with the use of the insanity defense is probably matched by its profound
disinterest in the role of incompetency in the criminal trial process. 15 There are
reasons for this: although incompetency is raised in far more cases than is the
insanity defense, courts rarely find defendants to be incompetent. 16 When they do,
prosecution is usually simply deferred (with the defendant in pretrial custody) until
the defendant regains his competency to stand trial; 17 if it is unlikely that the
defendant will regain his competency in the "foreseeable future" (a category
reserved for the most seriously mentally impaired), it is most likely that he will be
committed to a secure forensic hospital for a lengthy stay (in many cases, a lifetime
commitment). 18 In such cases, defendants may very well simply "fade away" from
public consciousness. Defendants in this category rarely are the "type" of
defendants who commit the highly-publicized acts that have generated

0

362 U .S. 402, 402 (1960), quoted in Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2686.
For students' notes, see Brian Boch, Note, Fourteenth Amendment-the Standard of M ental Competency
to Waive Constitutional Rights Versus the Competency Standard to Stand Tnal, 84 J. CRIM. L & CR!MINOL
883, 883 (1994) (Godinez is a "correct[)" decision); Luke Vadas, Note, Godinez v. Moran: An Insane
Rule for Competency? 39 LoY. L REv. 903 (1994) (Godinez leaves "unprotected the basic due process
rights of mentally ill criminal defendants"). For Dr. Felthous's analysis, see Alan Felthous, The Right to
Represent Oneself Incompetently: Competency to Waive Counsel and Conduct One's Own Defense Before and
After Godinez, 18 MENT. & PHYs. Dis. L REP. 105, 11 O (1994) (in Godinez, Supreme Court "missed an
opportunity to promote reason, logic, and justice in American jurisprudence"). See also Sheila Taub,
Competency Standard Clarified, NAT"L LJ., Oct. 18, 1993, at 25 (majority decision in Godinez "appears to
be contrary to much professional opinion, both legal and medical, and to prevailing trends in the law") .
12
See articles cited in 2 PERuN, supra note 7, §5.65A, at 99-100 n.1088.60 (1995 Supp.).
13
See articles cited in 3 id., §15.25A, at 207-09 n.479.46 (1995 Supp.).
14
A search of the NEXIS/CURNWS database in LEXIS revealed not a single contemporaneous
newspaper editorial commenting on the decision. The only law review commentary has been the articles
cited supra note 11.
15
See generally MICHAEL L PERuN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 1liE INSANITY DEFENSE 34 (1994); see also 3
Pruu:iN,
supra note 7, §14.02, at 206--07 n.1.
16
Bruce Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L Rev. 921, 922 n.3, 925 (1985).
17
See generally id. at 921-31.
18
See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
'
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controversy over the insanity debate. 19 In short, the public has never been terribly
interested in this area of the law, an apathy usually shared by the press and other
media.
The arrest and trial of Colin Ferguson, however, focused national attention on
this question. Even without the issues that are central to this article, Ferguson's case
had all the high cards of a media circus: a mass murder on a New York City
commuter train by a black defendant who sought out white victims as his targets. 20
When the level of Ferguson's mental illness became clear, the picture was complete.
And public attention was intensified when Ferguson-relying (implicitly, at least)
on Godinez-chose to represent himself at his trial, and chose specifically to disavow
an insanity defense (based on a purported "black rage" theory) proposed by his
lawyers, the high-profile William Kunstler and an associate. 21 The spectacle of a
highly intelligent but seriously mentally ill defendant opening to the jury, doing
direct and cross examination, and entering evidentiary objections, struck onlookers
as yet another argument for the widely-held view (endorsed by many) that the
American judicial system was flawed beyond repair. 22
And yet, public attitudes toward the Ferguson trial were dramatically different
from those toward other mentally ill defendants. In other cases, insanity pleaders
were seen as shamming, malingering, pulling the wool over.the courts' eyes, and so
on. 23 Here, the fact that Ferguson was allowed to represent himself-and his failure
to enter an insanity plea-was seen as a charade, a travesty of justice, or a sham. 24 In
other such cases, lawyers are regularly pilloried for their "sleazy'' tactics in
promoting mental state defenses (and once-in-a-lifetime cases such as the alleged
use of the "twinkie" defense in the Dan White case are discussed as if the use of
such a plea is common); 25 here, the lack of counsel-even a counsel so regularly
vilified by the public as Kunstler-was seen as, for want of a better phrase, utterly
crazy. 26 In short, Ferguson's use of Justice Thomas's majority opinion in Godinez
(in one of the many ironies of this case, Ferguson has .likened himself to Justice
Thomas, as another victim of a "high-tech lynching") 27 caused the public to
reverse--almost completely- many of the "sanist" attitudes that -are regularly
invoked in "famous" cases involving mentally disabled crimin;ll defendants.
Why is this? And what are its implications for the development of mental
disability law, for the criminal trial process in general, for the ways that competence

19
But see Henry Steadman et al., Maintenance of an Insanity Defense Under Montana's "Abolition" of the
Insanity Defense, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 357 (1989) (after Montana abolished its insanity defense, the
ultimate effect was that courts found more defendants who would likely been previously found not guilty
by reason of insanity (NGRI) to be incompetent to stand trial, and committed them to the same forensic
maximum security facilities to which NGRI acquittees were previously sent).
20
DeWayne Wickham, Line Between Justice, Revenge, Gannet News Service, Feb. 2, 1995.
21
David Van Bieman, A Fool for a Client, TIME, Feb. 6, 1995, at 66.
22
Larry McShane, Ferguson's Defense of Himself May Be Grounds for Appeal, AUSTIN (TX) AMERICANSTATESMAN, Feb. 19, 1995, at A9.
23
PERLIN, supra note 15, at 111-12.
24
McShane, supra note 22.
25
PERLIN, supra note 15.
26
McShane, supra note 22.
27
Maureen Fan, Ferguson Speaks: In Interview, Reiterates His Innocence, NEWSDAY (Nassau-Suffolk ed.),
Mar. 17, 1995, at A6.
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is assessed, and for the way we generally construct mental disability? Does
Ferguson's case truly hoist Justice Thomas by his own petard? Could Justice
Thomas have ever dreamt that the Godinez decision would have led to the Ferguson
spectacle? And what can we make of the public's astonishing about face (relating to
its attitudes toward mental status defenses and the role of counsel in the criminal
trial process) in this case? Finally, what do the perspectives of sanism and
pretextuality teach us about Godinez and Ferguson?28
In Part II, I discuss the Godinez case and place it in the context of earlier
incompetency to stand trial case law. In Part ill, I discuss the Ferguson case, in the
context of Godinez, and consider how some of the "hidden factors" in Godinez may
be illuminated by the denouement of the Ferguson trial. In Part IV, I consider the
public attitudes toward the Ferguson trial, and try to "read" those attitudes in the
contexts of what we know about both sanism and pretextuality. I conclude that
the conduct of the Ferguson trial was inevitable after the Godinez decision, and that,
in the end, the criminal trial process was seriously robbed of its needed dignity.

II. THE GODINEZ CASE29
A. Introduction
Professors James Ellis and Ruth Luckasson have appropriately characterized the
issue of assessing the competence of guilty pleas entered by mentally disabled
defendants as presenting "one of the most difficult doctrinal and practical problems
faced by the criminal justice system," a difficulty reflected in the "sharply divided"
case law that has developed in this area. 30 Before Godinez, courts traditionally had
generally recognized that the standard for competence to plead guilty is generally
higher than for other sorts of consent or waiver.3 1 However, courts had split on the
significant question of whether the standard to plead guilty is the same as, higher
than, or otherwise different from, the traditional standard for assessing competence
to stand trial; for example, whether the defendant has "sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of understanding-and whether he
has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. " 32
The majority view had held that there is no substantial difference, and that the
same test applies in assessing the validity of a guilty plea. 33 Most of these decisions
28

See generally Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be
~ndo~e? 8 J. L. & HEALTII 15 (1993-94).
This section is generally adapted from Michael L. Perlin, A Major Step Backwards: Deciphering
~odinez v. Moran, 2 CRIM. PRAc. L. ·REP. 89 (1994); PERuN, supra note 6, §4.13; 3 Pmu.!N, supra note

.J §§14.20A-14.21 (1995 Supp.).

3

James Ellis & Ruth Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Cn'minal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414,

f60 (~985); see generally 3 Pmu.IN, supra note 7, §§14.20, at 265-69.
1

.
·
32 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 30, at 461.
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,402 (1960); see generally 3 Pmu.!N, supra note 7, §14.20, at 1404 n.317.1 (1995 Supp.) (listing recent cases).
See, e.g:, Malinauskas v. United States, 505 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1974); Stinson v. Wainwright, 710 F.2d
743 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 984 (1983); United States ex rel. McGough v. Hewitt, 528 F.2d 339
(3 d Cir. 1975); Williams v. Bordenkircher, 696 F.2d 464 (6th Cir.), cen. denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983);
People v. Turner, 443 N.E.2d 1167 (Ill. App. 1982); State ex rel. Kessick v. Bordenkircher, 294 S.E.2d
134 (W. Va. 1982).
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were merely conclusionary and bereft of any sort of doctrinal analysis. Only in People
v. Heral did a court offer substantive justifications for the unitary standard: that a
finding of competency to stand trial necessarily involved a finding that a defendant
was capable of waiving his constitutional rights, and a dual standard might create ''a
class of semi-competent defendants who are not protected from prosecution because
they have been found competent to stand trial, but who are denied the leniency of the
plea bargaining process because they are not competent to plead guilty. " 34
This position was challenged, however, by a series of cases involving both
mentally i1135 and mentally retarded 36 defendants. These cases suggested a separate
test: "A defendant is not competent to plead guilty if a mental [disability] has
substantially impaired his ability to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives
presented to him and to understand the consequences of his plea. " 37 Such a test has
been employed by those courts that find it necessary for judges to "assess a
defendant's competency with specific reference to the gravity of the decisions with which
the defendant is faced," 38 a test applauded by Ellis and Luckasson. 39 The rationale
for this more stringent standard was that a simple finding of trial competency was
not a sufficient basis for finding that the defendant was able to "make [other]
decisions of very serious import. " 40
On the question of waiver of counsel, a significant amount of case law had also
developed over the question of the level of competency required for a defendant to
waive representation by counsel. Since the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Faretta
v. California, 41 holding that a defendant has a federal constitutional right to
represent himself if he voluntarily elects to do so, courts have focused on the
question of whether a defendant has "the mental capacity to waive the right to counsel
with a realization of the probable risks and consequences of his action. " 42
To meet such a standard, it is not necessary that the defendant be technically
competent to represent himself but only that he be "free of mental disorder which
would so impair his free will that his decision to waive counsel would not be
voluntary." 43 To this end, neither bizarre statements and actions, 44 mere eccentric
behavior, 45 nor a finding that the defendant had been diagnosed as a paranoid
schizophrenic46 have been found in specific cases to be enough to establish lack of
capacity to represent oneself.

34

342 N .E . 2d 34, 37 (Ill. 1976), citing Comment, Competence to Plead Guilty: A New Standard, 1974
DUKE L. J. 149, 170.
35 Seiling v. Eyman, 478 F .2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973); Ste4lsvik v. Vinzant, 640 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1981);
State v. Walton, 228 N.W.2d 21 (Iowa 1975).
36
See United States v. Masthers, 539 F. 2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
37
Seiling, 478 F . 2d at 215; see also Schoeller v. Dunbar, 423 F. 2d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir. 1970).
38
Seiling, 478 F. 2d at 215.
39
Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 30, at 462-63.
40
Seiling, 478 F . 2d at 214-15.
41
422 U .S. 806, 835 (1975).
42
People v. Clark, 213 Cal. Rptr. 837, 840 (App. 1985) (emphasis in original). See generally 3 PERLIN,
supra note 7, §14.21, at 269-74. But see In re Irwin, 529 N .W.2d 366, 371 (Minn. 1995) (patient in
psychopathic personality commitment case had no right to self-representation).
43
Curry v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 141 Cal. Rptr. 884, 888 (App. 1977).
44
People v. Miller, 167 Cal. Rptr. 816, 818 (App. 1980).
45
Curry, 14 1 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
46
State v. Evans, 610 P. 2d 35 (Ariz. 1980).·
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On the other hand, waiver of counsel should be "carefully scrutinized,"47 and the
record must reflect that "the accused was offered counsel and knowingly and
intelligently refused the offer. " 48 The court is required to conduct "more than a
routine inquiry when making that determination. " 49 Thus, at least several courts
have found than the standard for self-representation is a higher one than the
standard for competency to stand trial, 50 since "literacy and a basic understanding
over and above the competence to stand .trial may be required." 51
A New Jersey intermediate appellate court has thus considered the full range of
peninent issues:
Without the guiding hand of counsel, a defendant may lose his freedom
because he does not how to establish his innocence .... Trained counsel is also
necessary to vindicate fundamental rights that receive protection from rules of
procedure and exclusionary principles .... Where the doctrine supporting these
rights "has any complexities the untrained defendant is in no position to defend
himself." . . .
These considerations militate strongly in favor of exercising .great caution in
determining whether a proposed waiver of counsel satisfies constitutional
standards. Within the context of the potential pitfalls of self-representation, it
has been said "the court must make cenain by direct inquiry on the record that
defendant is aware of 'the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included
with them, the range of allowable punishments there under, possible defenses to
the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential
to a broad understanding of the whole matter.' " 52

B. Godinez
The Supreme Court ended both of these controversies in Godinez, where it held that
the standards for pleading guilty and for waiving counsel were no higher than for
standing trial: Did the defendant have "sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of understanding" and a "rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him"? 53
The facts of the Godinez case are straight-forward. The defendant Moran shot a
hanender and a patron, and subsequently stole the bar's cash register. Nine days
l~ter, he went to his former wife's apartment, and shot her five times. He then shot
hunself in the abdomen and attempted (unsuccessfully) to slit his own wrists. All
three of his victims died; Moran confessed to police from his hospital bed two days
after the shooting of his wife. 54 He initially pied not guilty, and was evaluated by a
47

p

48

,d.

,

eople v. Kessler, 447 N.E.2d 495, 499 (Ill. App. 1983), citing Heral, 342 N.E.2d at 37-38.

:: Id., citing People v. Feliciano, 417 N.E. 824 (Ill. App. 1981).
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent, 526 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1975); State v.
Kolocotronis, 436 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1968); Pickens v. State, 292 N.W.2d 601 (Wis. 1980); State v.
;iiar~ing, 670 P.2d 383, 391 (Ariz. 1983).
Pickens, 292 N.W. 2d at 611, citing Faretra, 422 U .S. at 835.
52
State v. Slattery, 571 A.2d 1314, 1320-21 (N.J. App. Div. 1990) (citations omitted) (defendant
~ctioned at "low average" range of intelligence).
113 S. Ct. at 2685, quoting Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
54
Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2682.
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pair of psychiatrists who found him competent to stand trial. Some 2 1/2 months
after these evaluations were done, Moran appeared before the court, seeking to
discharge his attorneys and plead guilty, explaining that he wanted to prevent the
presentation of mitigating evidence at his sentencing. 55 The court accepted his
guilty plea and his waiver of counsel, finding that he could "intelligently and
knowingly" waive his right to assistance of counsel, and that his guilty pleas had
been "freely and voluntarily" given. He was subsequently sentenced to death by a
three-judge court on each of the three murders.56
Subsequently, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Moran's sentence for the
tavern murders, but reversed the sentence for his wife's murder, and remanded the
case for imposition of a life sentence without possibility of parole. 57 Next, Moran
filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the state trial court; the court rejected his
claim that he was "mentally incompetent to represent himself." 58 His appeal was
dismissed by the state Supreme Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari.59
Moran then filed a federal habeas petition. It was denied by the District Court,
but the District Court's denial was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial record should have led the trial court to
"entertain a good faith doubt about [Moran's] competency to make a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver," and that waiver of constitutional rights required a
"higher level of mental functioning than that required to stand trial," a level it
characterized as "the capacity for 'reasoned choice.' " 60 In coming to its decision,
the appellate court stressed the defendant's suicide attempt, his desire to prevent the
presentation of mitigating evidence to the court at his sentencing hearing, his
"monosyllabic" responses to the trial court's questions, and the fact that he was on
four different prescription drugs at the time he sought to change his plea and
discharge counsel. 61
The Supreme Court reversed, per Justice Thomas, rejecting the notion that
competence to plead guilty or waive counsel must be measured by a higher (or even
different) standard from that used in incompetency to stand trial cases. 62 It
reasoned that a defendant who was found competent to stand trial would have to
make a variety of decisions requiring choices: whether to testify, whether to seek a
jury trial, whether to cross-examine his accusers, and, in some cases, whether to
raise an affirmative defense. While the decision to plead guilty is a "profound
one, ... it is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a defendant
may be called upon to make during the course of a trial. " 63 Finally, the Court
reaffirmed that any waiver of constitutional rights must be "knowing and
voluntary. " 64

55
56

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 2682- 83.
Id. at 2683.
Moran v. State, 734 P. 2d 712 (Nev. 1987).
Godinez, 113 S. Ct at 2683.
Moran v. Warden, 810 P. 2d 335 (Nev. 1989), cert. den., 493 U .S. 874 (1989).
Moran v. Godinez, 972 F . 2d 263, 265-67 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993) .
Id. at 265, 268.
Godinez, 113 S. Ct at 2686.
Id.
.
Id., quoting Parke v. Raley, 113 S. Ct. 517, 523 (1992).
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It concluded on this point:
Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to
ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist
counsel. While psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to classify the various
kinds and degrees of competence, and while States are free to adopt competency
standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process
·
Clause does not impose these additional requirements. 65
Justices Kennedy and Scalia concurred. They noted their concern with those
aspects of the opinion that compared the decisions made by a defendant who pleads
guilty with those made by one who goes to trial, and they expressed their "serious
doubts" that there would be a heightened competency standard under the Due
Process clause if these decisions were not equivalent. 66
Justice Blackmun dissented (for himself and Justice Stevens), focusing squarely
on what he saw as the likely potential that Moran's decision to plead guilty was the
product of "medication and mental illness. " 67 He reviewed the expert testimony as
to the defendant's state of depression, a colloquy between the defendant and the
trial judge in which the court was informed that the defendant was being given
medication, the trial judge's failure to inquire further and discover the psychoactive
Properties of the drugs in question, the defendant's subsequent testimony as to the
"numbing" state of the drugs, and the "mechanical character" and "ambiguity" of
the defendant's answers to the court's questions at the plea stage. 68
On the question of the multiple meanings of competency, Justice Blackmun added:
[T]he majority cannot isolate the term "competent" and apply it in a vacuum,
divorced from its specific context. A person who is "competent" to pJay
basketball is not thereby "competent" to play the violin. The majority's
monolithic approach to competency is true to neither life or the law.
Competency for one purpose does not necessarily translate to competency for
another purpose. 69
·
lie concluded:
To try, convict and punish one so helpless to defend himself contravenes
fundamental principles of fairness and impugns the integrity of our criminal
65

Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2688, citing, in a cf. reference, Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992) (not
~cons~tutional to place burden of proof on defendant at competency to stand trial proceeding).
67 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2688- 89.
Id. at 2692.
68
I~. See also id. at 2696 ("such drugs often-possess side effects that may 'compromise the right of a
medicated criminal defendant to receive a fair trial . . . by rendering him unable or unwilling to assist
counsel,"' quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 181819 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). S ee
g~rally 2 PERuN, supra note 7, §5.65A (1995 pocket part); Michael L. Perlin, Forced Drugging and Fair
Trial Rights: Understanding Riggins v. Nevada1 I CRIM. PRAc. L. REP. 37 (1993); Michael L. Perlin & .
Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence,
l l BEHAv. Sa. & L. 47 (1993) .
.~e drugs given Moran were primarily antiseizure medications, see Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2683 n.2;
Riggins had been receiving Mellaril. The fact that different types of drug were involved in the two cases
:as explored nowhere in any of the Godinez opinions.
Id. at 2694, citing Richard Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Def endants: A Theoretical Reformulation,
~!3EHAv. Ser. & L. 291, 299 (1992); RONAID ROESCH & STEPHEN GOWING, COMPETENCY TO STAND
'1UAl. 10}3 (1980).

70

M. L. Perlin

justice system. I cannot condone the decision to accept, without further inquiry,
the self-destructive "choice" of a person who was so deeply medicated and who
might well have been severely mentally ill. 70
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Godinez is a powerful document that speaks
simultaneously to the empirical realities of the criminal trial process, the impact of
mental illness and medication on a defendant's capacity for reasoned choice, and,
perhaps most importantly, the role of pretextuality in the incompetency to stand
trial process. 71 He rejects the formulistic approach of Justice Thomas's majority
opinion, weighs the pertinent social science evidence, and demonstrates how the
trial record reflects the "ambiguity" of the controlling colloquy between counsel
and the trial judge. The underlying tensions of the case are exacerbated even
further because the defendant had been sentenced to death. The Supreme
Court has considered the relationship between mental illness and the competency
to · be executed, 72 the relationship between mental retardation and the
competency to be executed, 73 and more recently has declined to consider on the
merits the constitutionality of medicating a defendant so as to make him
competent to be executed. 74 The decision in Godinez-virtually guara~teeing less
searching inquiries in cases involving defendants of questionable competencywill likely complicate even further this area of mental disability law
jurisprudence. 75
The Court's decision is particularly troubling and perplexing, given its opinion
the prior year in Riggins. In Riggins, the Court found that the involuntary drugging
of an insanity-pleading defendant at trial potentially violated that defendant's fair
trial rights. 76 The Court also found that, because involuntary medication could
impair a defendant's ability to ''follow the proceedings," "the substance of his
communication," and "the content of his testimony," 77 such drugging would be
proscribed unless the state could demonstrate medical appropriateness and that,
considering less intrusive alternatives or means, that it was "essential for the sake of
[defendant's] own safety or the safety of others" or so as to obtain an adjudication of
the defendant's guilt or innocence. 78
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Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2694.
See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MlAMI L.
REY. 625 (1993) (Perlin, Pretexts). See also infra Part IV B.
'
72 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). See generally 3 PERLIN, supra note 7, §17.05, at498-512;
compare Douglas Mossman, The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency: Fording Murky Waters, 43 CASE
W. Rlls. U. L. REY. 1 (1992).
73 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). See generally 3 PERLIN, supra, note 7, §17.06A (1995
Supp.).
74
See Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990). See generally 3 PERLIN, supra, note 7, §17.06B (1995
Supp.); compare Douglas Mossman, Denouement of an Execution Case: Is Perry Pyrrhic? 23 Buu.. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 269 (1995).
75
See, e.g., United States v. Day, 998 F. 2d 662 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting defendant's claim that the
court should have conducted a competency hearing prior to allowing him to proceed pro se); compare
State v. Pollard, 657 A. 2d 185, 18990 (Vt. 1995) (construing Godinez to reverse trial court order
allowing waiver of counsel in case of defendant who did not have "rational" understanding of
proceedings).
76
Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814-16.
77
Id. at 1816.
78
Id. at 1815.
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Moran was receiving such drugs and, as Justice Blackmun underscores in his
dissent, the court's perfunctory questions "only augment[ed) the manifold causes
for concern by suggesting that his waivers and his assent to the charges against him
were not rendered in a truly voluntary and intelligent fashion. " 79 Inexplicably, the
majority in Godinez does not even cite Riggins.
Riggins is even more important because of its chronology in the court's refusalof-medication jurisprudence. It came soon after the court had decided in
Washington v. Harper8° that an informal administrative procedure was sufficient to
satisfy the refusal of medication rights of a convicted prisoner. 81 The difference
between Harper and Riggins appeared to reflect the different status of the litigants:
Harper, a convicted prisoner, and Riggins, a non-convicted defendant at trial.
The decision in Harper appeared to reflect an important strand of the court's
institutional jurisprudence: that "prison security interests will, virtually without
exception, trump individual autonomy interests. " 82 Yet, the potential sideeffects and other impacts of antipsychotic medications are ignored in
I
Godinez, notwithstanding the reality that Moran (like Riggins and unlike Harper)
had not yet been convicted at the moment that he entered his plea and
discharged his counsel. The Godinez opinion is utterly bereft of any analysis of this
issue.
In its other major holding, the Godinez court found that there was "no reason" to
believe that the decision to waive counsel requires an "appreciably higher level of
mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights. " 83 It
rejected the defendant's arguments that a self-representing defendant must have
"greater powers of comprehension, judgment and reason, than would be necessary
to stand trial with the aid of an attorney," concluding th~t this rested on a "flawed
Premise; the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to
counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent
himself." 84 Relying on its decision in Faretta, 8 5 the Court found that a defendant's
ability to represent himself "has no bearing upon his competence to choose selfrepresentation. ' ' 86
Justice Blackmun's dissented on this point as well, concluding:
A finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial establishes only that he is
capable of aiding his attorney in making the critical decisions required at trial or
in plea negotiations. The reliability or even relevance of such a finding vanishes
when its basic premise-that counsel will be present-ceases to exist. The
question is no longer whether the defendant can proceed with an attorney but
whether he can proceed alone and uncounselled. 87

79
80
81
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84
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Gd "
° mez, 113 S. Ct. at 2696.
494 U.S. 210 (1990).
See ~enerally 2 PERuN, supra, note 7, §5.64A (1995 Supp.) .
See id. at 82; see generally, Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 68.
Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2682.
Id. at 2686-87 (emphasis in original).
4 22 ~.S. 806 (1975); see supra text accompanying note 41.
Godinez, 113 S.Ct. at 2687.
Id. at 2693.
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III. THE FERGUSON CASE
A. The Crime and Trial
On December 7, 1993, Colin Ferguson, a 3 7 year old native of Jamaica, killed six
people and wounded 19 others on a Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) commuter train
from New York City as it arrived in Garden City, Long Island. 88 When arrested,
Ferguson was found with 150 rounds of ammunition and notes in his pockets
suggesting a hatred of whites and p ersons of Asian ancestry. 89 Ferguson was
originally represented by William Kunstler, a well-known lawyer often associated
with unpopular or controversial causes. He fired Kunstler, however, when Kunstler
announced that he planned to pursue an insanity defense based on a "black rage"
theory: Ferguson, a highly-intelligent, but mentally disturbed individual who had
been raised as "a child of privilege in his native Jamaica," 90 had been "pushed over
the edge into murder by endemic American racism." 91 Ferguson stated h e would
rather represent himself and prove--in spite of a staggering number of eyewitnesses
to the contrary92- that a Caucasian perpetrator stole his gun and did the. shootings
in question. 93
At a pretrial hearing in December 1994, psychologists John D'Alessandro and
Allen Reidman testified that Ferguson, while suffering from paranoid personality
disorder, was rational and free from delusions. 94 Based on these reports and on his
own questioning of the witness, Nassau County Court Judge Donald E. Belfi found
Ferguson competent to stand trial. 95 This decision appeared totally consistent both
with the teachings of Godinez and with both pre-Godinez and post-Godin~z New
York state decisions, 96 decisions which supported the holding that an "articulate,
intelligent and rational" defendant such as Ferguson had a constitutional right to
represent himself. 97
88 John T . McQuiston, In the B izarre L.I.R.R. Trial, Equally Bizarre Confrontation, N.Y. nMES (L.I. ed.),
Feb. 5, 1995, sec. 13LI, at 1.
89
Bruce Frankel, Justice ''At Its Worst"!NY Defendant Acts as Lawyer, USA TODAY, Jan. 27, 1995, at 40.
90
Sheryl McCarthy, Ferguson: M adness or Just Manipulation? N EWSDAY (city ed.), Feb. 22, 1995, at 6.
91
Van Bieman, supra note 21. See, e.g., Claire Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical A ccount of the Defense in
Law, 37 Aruz. L. REv. 251, 280 (1995); J. Thomas Sullivan, Psychiatric Defenses in Arkansas Criminal
Trials, 48 ARK. L. REv. 439, 454 (1995). The defense was rejected in State v. Lamar, 698 P. 2d 735, 741
(Ariz. App. 1984). For a recent discussion of "syndromic defenses" in general, see Stephen Morse, The
"New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome," CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1995, at 3.
92
John T . McQuiston, Adviser Says L.I.R.R. Suspect Prefers Conviction to Insanity Finding, N.Y. nMES,
Feb. 10, 1995, at BS.
.
93
Wickham, supra note 20.
94
Robin Topping, Weighing Competence vs. Sanity, N EWSDAY, (Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Feb. 5, 1995, at
A6.
95 Id.
96
See, e.g., People v. Reason, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 614, 618 (1975) (determination that defendant was
competent to stand trial, coupled with trial judge's "searching inquiry" as to whether decision was made
"knowingly and intelligently with full awareness of risks and consequences," sufficient to support waiver);
People v. Schoolfield, 608 N .Y.S. 2d 413, 41617 (App. Div. 1994) ("A criminal defendant is entitled to
be master of his own fate and 'respect for individual autonomy requires that he be allowed to go to jail
under his own banner ifhe so desires and ifhe makes the choice "with eyes open,"' " quoting, in part,from
People v. Vivenzio, 477 N.Y.S. 2d 318, 319 (App. Div. 1984) (Godinez not cited); People v. Meurer, 621
N .Y.S. 2d 422, 42324 (App. Div. 1994) (affirming conviction where, after defendant was found
competent to stand trial, trial court found decision to waive was made " knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily with full awareness of the risks and consequences") (Godinez not cited) .
97
Topping, supra note 94, at A6.

Godinez and Ferguson

73

At trial, Ferguson opened by telling the jury that he was charged with:
93 [criminal] counts, only because it matches the year 1993. Had it been 1925, it
would have been 25 counts. This is a case of stereotype victimization of a Black
man and subsequent conspiracy to destroy him. 98
The manner in which Ferguson conducted his defense was described aptly by a
Boston Globe commentator as providing "uniquely creepy television," and, quoting

Court TV president Steven Brill, the ultimate triumph of "form over substance. " 99
~ong the defense strategies used by Ferguson included the announcement that he
would call as a witness a parapsychologist and exorcist who would testify that
government agents had planted a microchip in Ferguson's head and that he
(Ferguson) had been "lasered out by a remote-control device." 100 Also, during his
cross-examination of the ballistics expert, Ferguson asked whether the bullet
fragments had been tested for "alcohol or substance abuse." 101
In his summation-characterized uniformly as "rambling and sometimes
incoherent"-he argued that the 19 shooting survivors had conspired with police
authorities to convict him. 102 Finally, in his allocution statement at sentencing, he
told the court:
Jeffrey Dahmer's death in prison was not coincidence. It was timed just moments
before I was given pro se status in anticipation of my trial beginning in a matter
where it was setting the precedent for my murder in an upstate prison. 103
Ferguson was convicted on six counts of murder and 22 counts of attempted
murder, weapons possession, and reckless endangerment, and acquitted on 25
counts of civil-rights violations. 104 He was sentenced to over 300 years in prison. 105
The observation that Ferguson's courtroom behavior ranged from the "bizarre to
the surreal" 106 was never contradicted.

B. Ferguson and Godinez
~ow does the Ferguson trial "fit" with the Supreme Court's Godinez decision?
Fll'st, it demonstrates precisely how difficult the trial judge's task is in honoring
98
99

Transcript 1109-5, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, WEEKEND EDmON, FEB. 5, 1995.
Frederic Biddle, In Ferguson, TV Gets New Spectacle, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 1995, at 1.
John T. McQuiston, Commuter Killing Trial Goes to Jury: Ferguson Gives Incoherent Summation,
Hous-roN CHRONICLE, Feb. 17, 1995, at A2. For a flavor of other defense tactics, see, e.g., McShane,
supra note 11; Andrew Blum, LIRR Gunman Goes Pro Se With Perplexing Voir Dire, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6,
199 5, at All; John T. McQuiston, Abrupt End to Defense in Rail Case, N .Y. TlMEs, Feb. 16, 1995, at Bl.
~e delusion that a microchip has been planted in one's head may be symptomatic of paranoid
~chizophrenia, raising the question of whether another incompetency to stand trial inquiry should have
~en made at this point in the proceedings. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U .S. 162 (1971).
10
102 Court TV: Tape FER5610104 (Television broadcast, Feb. 2, 1995), Log timecode 12:50.
John T. McQuiston, Murder Trial in LI.R.R. Case Goes to the Jury for Deliberation, N.Y. Times
~eb.l 7, 1995), at 131.
104 C~urt TV: Tape FER5610204 (Television broadcast, Feb. 16, 1995), Log timecode 11:18.
Diana Rojas, LIRR Massacre Gunman Convicted of Murder; The Verdict, Guilty; N.J. Family Says
~deal Not Over, BERGEN (NJ) RECORD, Feb. 18, 1995, at Al.
·
(N Maureen Fan, 315 2/3 Years For Ferguson; Protesting to the End, LIRR Killer Sentenced, NEWSDAY
106 assa:u & Suffolk ed.), Mar. 23, 1995, at A4.
S Railroad Shooter Telephones Lawyers: Kunst/er Willing to Handle Ferguson Process of Appeals,
PRINGFIELD STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER, Feb. 19, 1995, at 3.
100
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Godinez's dictates. As Robin Topping-one of a small handful of trial observer/
reporters who understood the link between Godinez and the Ferguson trialpointed out in Newsday:

It's not a simple situation for the judge. ITudge) Belfi has to perform a delicate
balancing act. He is legally obligated to take extra precautions to make sure that
Ferguson is given a fair trial-especially because he is not a lawyer. He must be
careful that Ferguson doesn't disrupt the trial but he has to be equally careful in
revoking his right to represent himselflest he, Belfi, be reversed by a higher court. 107
Ferguson is yet another in a lengthy series of pre-Godinez and post-Godinez
cases concluding that "bizarre behavior" is not necessarily evidence of
incompetency. 108
Godinez purports to balance fair trial and autonomy issues, concluding that "a
criminal defendant's ability to represent himself has no bearing on his competence
to choose self- representation." 109 On the other hand, it warns that the wa~ver of
counsel must be "intelligent and voluntary" before it can be accepted. 110
· To what extent was this standard complied with in the Ferguson trial? Godinef
sp(,!aks only to questions of decisional competency: if the defendant has the capacity
to decide to waive counsel, then the standard for determining his competence to
stand trial will suffice. It ignores-fatally, in my view- the other question that is
needed to give life to an otherwise sterile and formalistic legal doctrine: Does the
defendant have the functional ability to represent himself? 111 This is the question
addressed by Justice Blackmun in his dissent, and studiously ignored by Justice
Thomas in the majority. It is here that Godinez fails and the reason for the Ferguson
"charade" becomes apparent: the key question-Did Colin Ferguson, truly, have
the capacity to conduct his own defense in a meaningful way, to conduct it 'with
dignity?-remains unasked. 11.2

107

Robin Topping, Crime and Courts; Law and Order; "The Pitfalls of Self-Representation," NEWSDAY
(Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Feb. 1, 1995, at A29. Pre-Godinez caselaw on the right of criminal defendants to
represent themselves is discussed supra note 96.
108
E.g., State v. Ploof, 649 A. 2d 774, 778 (Vt. 1994); Boag v. Raines, 769 F. 2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. den., 474 U.S. 1086 (1986); People v. Holma, 450 N.E. 2d 432,435 (Ill. 1983). See generally,
3 PERuN, supra note 7, §14.04 at 218-19.
109
Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2687.
no Id. at 2688.
1
"
Felthous, supra note 11, at 105; Taub, supra note 11, at 28, 29.
" 2 See Topping, supra note 107. Courts and commentators have regularly discussed "dignity" in a fair
trial context both in cases involving mentally disabled criminal defendants and in other settings. See, e.g.,
Marquez v. Collins, 11 F. 3d 1241. 1243 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Solemnity ... and respect for individuals are
components of a fair trial"); Heffernan v. Norris, 48 F. 3d 331, 336 (8th Cir. 1995) (Bright, J.,
dissenting) ("the forced ingestion of mildaltering drugs not only jeopardizes an accused's rights to a fair
trial, it also tears away another layer of individual dignity . .. "). See Felthous, supra note 11, quoting
Bruce Ennis & Christopher Hansen, Memorandum of Law: Competency to Stand Trial, 4 J. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 491, 512 (1976) (one of the four purposes of incompetency to stand trial determination is to "preserve
the dignity and integrity of legal processes"); Keith Nicholson, Would You Like Some More Salt in That
Wound? Post-Sentence VictimAllocution in Texas, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1103, 1128 (1995) (for trial to be fair,
"it must be conducted in an atmosphere of respect, order, decorum and dignity befitting its importance
both to the prosecution and the defense"); see also Tom R Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of
Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REY. 433, 444 (1992)
(significance of dignity values in involuntary civil commitment hearings); Deborah A. Dorfman,
Effectively Implementing Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act for Mentally Disabled Persons: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 8 J. L. & HEALTH l 05, 121 (1993-94) (same).
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Godinez is an example of the Supreme Court's willful blindness at its worst. The
court is aware-it must be aware-of the pretextual way that incompetency to stand
trial proceedings are frequently conducted. 113 The court is aware--it must be
aware--of the way that incompetent defendants are "shuttled':.' back and forth
between jail and mental hospital, reflecting frequent changes in their trial
competency status. 114 The court is aware--it has stated that it is aware--of the
potential impact of drug side effects on mentally disabled criminal defendants and
the integrity of the trial process. 115 And yet, in Godinez it blithely brushes all these
empirical realities aside and endorses a minimalistic test that is sure to further sap
the integrity of the criminal trial process.
Was Colin Ferguson functionally competent to conduct his own defense? 116
Some guidance here may be found in McKaskle v. Wiggins. 117 There, the Supreme
Court listed some ,.of the tasks a pro se defendant must be allowed to perform
without interference from "standby counsel": to control the organization and
content of his own defense, to make motions, to argue points oflaw, to participate in
voir dire, to question witnesses, and to address the court where appropriate. us It
defies credulity to suggest that Colin Ferguson was able to do these tasks in such a
way that insured a trial that reflected the type of "solemnity" and "dignity" that are
integral to a trial's fairness.

IV. SANISM, PRETEXTS, THE PUBLIC AND COLIN
FERGUSON
A. Sanism119
'.'Sanism" is an irrational prejudice of the same q~ality and character of other
Irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of
racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. 120 It infects both our

113

See generally Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 7 I.
See, e.g., Winick, supra note 15, at 936 n. 57, cited in Commonwealth v. DelVerde, 496 N.E 2d 1357,
60 (Mass. 1986); State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W. 2d 409,415 (Mo. 1987).
See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992), discussed supra notes 76-78; see also Heller v.
Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2645 (1993) (institutionalized mentally ill persons are subjected to "invasive"
~~atrnems such as the use of psychotropic drugs).
For an important recent debate on this issue, compare Richard Bonnie, The Competence of Cn'minal
Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REY. 539 (1993), to Bruce Winick, Reforming
Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Proposal and Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
~~OL. 571 (1995),
465 U.S. 168 (1984).
118
Id. at 176-79. These aspects of McKaskle are carefully discussed in Felthous, supra note 11, at
107.
114
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ext accompanying notes 120-35 is generally adapted from Perhn, supra note 28.
:nie classic treatise is GoRDON AilPORT, THE NATURE OF PR:e)uoICE (1955). On the way that ·
samsm incorporates a multistep "prejudice assimilation model," see Keri Gould, "Madness in the
ftreets" Rides the Waves of Sanism, 9 N.Y. L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 567, 574-81 (1992) (book review of R.J.
& v.c. ARMAT, MADNESS IN TIIE STREETS: How PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW ABANDONED TIIE
'"''-NTAU,y lu. (1990)),
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jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. 121 Sanism is largely invisible and largely
socially acceptable. It is based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition,
and deindividualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged
"ordinary common sense" (OCS) and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious
response to events both in everyday life and in the legal process.
Judges are not immune from sanism. "[E]mbedded in the cultural
presuppositions that engulf us all," 122 they express discomfort with social
science 123 (or any other system that may appear to challenge law's hegemony over
society) and skepticism about new thinking; this discomfort and skepticism allows
them to take deeper refuge in heuristic thinking and flawed, non-reflective OCS,
both of which perpetuate the myths and stereotypes of sanism. 124
Sanism is readily detected in court processes in mental disability law cases. Judges
reflect and project the conventional morality of the community, and judicial decisions
in all areas of civil and criminal mental disability law continue to reflect and perpetuate
sanist stereotypes. 125 Judical language demonstrates bias against mentally disabled
individuals 126 and contempt for the mental health professions. 127 Courts often appear
impatient with mentally disabled litigants, ascribing their problems in the legal process
to weak character or poor resolve. Thus, a popular sanist myth is that "[m]entally

121

The phrase "sanism" appears to have been coined by Dr. Morton Birnbaum. See Morton Birnbaum,
The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on its Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN
HEALTH CARE 97, 106--07 (F. Ayd ed. 1974); see Perlin, supra note 27, at 9293 (discussing Bimbaum's
insights). See also Koe v. Califano, 573 F . 2d 761, 764 (2d Cir. 1978). Dr. Birnbaum is universally
regarded as having first developed and articulated the constitutional basis of the right to treatment
doctrine for institutionalized mental patients. See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J.
499 (1960), discussed in 2 PERLIN, supra note 7, §4.03, at 8-13.
122
Anthony D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 WM. & MARYL. REv. 329,
332 (1991).
123
The discomfort that judges often feel in having to decide mental disability law cases is often palpable.
See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Are Couns Competent To Decide Competency Questions? Stripping the Facade
From United States v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REY. 957,991 (1990) (court's characterization in Chaners,
863 F . 2d 302,310 (4th Cir 1988) (en bane), cen. den., 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), of judicial involvement in
right to refuse antipsychotic medication cases as "'already perilous' . . . reflects the court's almost
palpable discomfort in having to confront the questions before it").
124
Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic
Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REY. 3, 61-69 (1990) (Perlin, Psychodynamics); Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the
Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 599, 618-30
(1989-90).
125
See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REv. 373, 400-04 (1992).
126
See, e.g., Com v. Zant, 708 F. 2d 549,569 (11th Cir. 1983), reh. den., 714 F. 2d 159 (11th Cir. 1983),
cen. den., 467 U.S. 1220 (1984) (defendant referred to as a "lunatic"); Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F. 2d
1516, 1522 (11th Cir., 1987), quoting Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F. 2d 213 (5th Cir. 1974) (using
"lunatic"); Brown v. People, 134 N.E. 2d 760, 762 (Ill. 1956) (judge asked defendant, "You are not crazy
at this time, are you?"); Pyle v. Boles, 250 F. Supp. 285, 289 (N.D. W. Va. 1966) (trial judge accused
habeas petitioner of "being crazy"); but cf. State v. Penner, 772 P. ,2d 819 (Kan. 1989) (unpublished
disposition), at *3 (witnesses admonished not to refer to defendant as "crazy" or "nuts").
121
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Musolino, 467 A. 2d 605 (Pa. Super. 1983) (reversible error for trial
judge to refer to expert witnesses as "headshrinkers"). Compare State v. Percy, 507 A. 2d 955, 956 (Vt.
1986), app'l after remand, 595 A. 2d 248 (Vt. 1990), cen. den., 112 S. Ct. 344 (1991) (conviction reversed
where prosecutor, in closing argument, referred to expert testimony as "psychobabble"), to
Commonwealth v. Cosme, 575 N.E. 2d 726, 731 (Mass. 1991) (not error where prosecutor referred
to defendant's expert witnesses as "a little head specialist'' and a "wizard").
·
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disabled individuals simply don't try hard enough. They give in too easily to their
basest instincts, and do not exercise appropriate self-restraint". 128
Sanist thinking allows judges to avoid difficult choices in mental disability law
cases. Their reliance on non-reflective, self-referential alleged "ordinary common
sense" contributes further to the pretextuality that underlies much of this area of
law.

B. Pretextuality
The entire relationship between the legal process and mentally disabled litigants is
often pretextual. By this I mean simply that courts accept (either implicitly. or
explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (frequently
meretricious) decisionmaking, specifically where witnesses, especially expert
witnesses, shqw a "high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order
to achieve desired ends." 129 This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all participants
in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans
Participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blase judging, and, at times,
Perjurious and/or corrupt testifying. The reality is well known to frequent
consumers of judicial services in this area: to mental health advocates and other
Public defender/legal aid/legal service lawyers assigned to represent patients and
mentally disabled criminal defendants, to prosecutors and state attorneys assigned
to represent hospitals, to judges who regularly hear such cases, to expert and lay
witnesses, and, most importantly, to the mentally disabled persons involved in the
litigation in question.
The pretexts of the forensic mental health system are reflected both in the
testimony of forensic experts and in the decisions of legislators and fact-finders. 130
Experts
frequently testify in accordance with their own self-referential concepts of
,,
morality" 131 and openly subvert statutory and caselaw criteria that impose rigorous
be~avioral standards as predicates for commitment132 or that articulate functional
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er m, supra note 125, at 396. See, e.g.,J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric ofResponsibiliry, 76 VA. L. REV. 197,238
(l 99 0) (Hinckley prosecutor suggested to jurors, " if Hinckley had emotional problems, they were largely his
own fault") . See also State v. Duckworth, 496 So. 2d 624, 635 (La. App. 1986) (juror who felt defendant
~Ould
be responsible for actions as long as he "wanted to do them" not excused for. cause) (no error).
9
~c.hael- L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextualiry, Psychiatry and Law: Of ('Ordinary Common Sense,"
Heunsuc Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BUIL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991) .
~ee
also Charles Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 839, 840 (1974).
0
See, e.g., Streicher v. Prescott, 663 F . Supp. 335, 343 (D.D.C. 1987) (although District of Columbia
~ode contained provision that patient could invoke to seek periodic review of commitment or
IIldep.endent psychiatric evaluation, in 22 years since passage of relevant statute, not a single patient
exercised rights to statutory review). Toe significance of Streicher is discussed in Arlene Kanter,
~bandcned but Not Forgotten: The Illegal Confinement of Elderly People in State Psychiatric Institutions, 19
u?•U. REv. L. & Soc•L CHANGE 273, 304-06 (1991-92).
S~e, e.g., Cassia Spohn & Julia Homey, "The Law's the Law, But Fair Is Fair": Rape Shield Laws and
Officials' Assessments of Sexual History Evidence, 29 CRIMINOL 137, 139 (1991) (a legal reform that
con~diets deeply held beliefs may result either in open defiance of the law or in a surreptitious attempt to
~odify the law). Compare H. RICHARD UVILUlR, TEMPERED ZEAL 116--18 (1988) (police sanction perjury
~ cases where Supreme Court has imposed constitutional rules that do not comport with officers' "own
~ea. of fair play"), with Tracey Maclin, Seeing the Constitution from the Backseat of a Police Squad Car (Book
13fV1ew of H.R. UVULER, supra) 70 B.U. L REV. 543) 580-82 (1990) (criticizing view).
See, e.g., Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 71, at 135-36.
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standards as prerequisites for an incompetency to stand trial finding. 133 Often this
testimony is further warped by a heuristic bias. Expert witnesses-like the rest of
us-succumb to the seductive allure of simplifying cognitive devices in their
thinking, and employ such heuristic gambits as the vividness effect in their
testimony.
This testimony is then weighed and evaluated by frequently-sanist fact-finders. 134
Judges and jurors, both consciously and unconsciously, frequently rely on
reductionist, prejudice-driven stereotypes in their decisionmaking, thus
subordinating statutory and caselaw standards as well as the legitimate interests of
the mentally disabled persons who are the subject of the litigation. Judges'
predispositions to employ the same sorts of heuristics as do expert witnesses further
contaminate the process. 135

C. The Ferguson Trial
Was the Ferguson trial pretextual? Was it a "sham, a charade... ", or was it the
vindication of a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to self-representation? In
one of the most unscriptable ironies of the entire affair, Ferguson likened himself to
Clarence Thomas, claiming they had both been victims of "high tech legal
lynchings." 136 One wonders how Ferguson would have responded had he known
that Thomas authored the Godinez opinion that set the wheels of justice in motion in
his own case. The Court's holding in Godinez reflected at its base the court's
profound disinterest in (and perhaps, cynicism about) the integrity of the criminal
trial process. Its opinion must be read against the background of both its decision in
Strickland v. Washington, 131 and the reality that counsel generally made available to
mentally disabled persons is substandard (and especially substandard in the case of
mentally disabled criminal defendants). 138
Was the Ferguson trial sanist? This is an exceedingly difficult question to answer.
At first glance, it appears that Godinez was the rarest of all creatures: a nonsanist
opinion that captured the votes of Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas, the core
of the Court that has consistently taken the most sanist positions in their
opinions. 139 Godinez-specifically-appears to grant significant autonomy to
133
See, e.g., People v. Doan, 366 N.W. 2d 593, 598 (Mich. App. 1985), app'l den. (1985) (expert testified
that defendant was "out in left field" and went "bananas").
134
See generally Perlin, supra note 125; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 68.
135
See generally Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 71.
136
Fan, supra note 27. Ironically, Justice Thomas and Ferguson are "twinned" in an opinion piece
written shortly after O.J. Simpson was apprehended:

A black person says, "The same spot in my heart that was bruised over Clarence Thomas, Mike
Tyson, Michael Jackson, Tupac Shakut, and Colin Ferguson, the same spot that gets bruised by the
nightly local news parade of black hands in handcuffs has been rebruised."
Alison Taylor, "Girl, There's Another Black Man Gone," PALM BEACH POST, June 26, 1994, at lF
(emphasis added).
137
466 U .S. 668, 687 (1984) . (establishing a pallid, almost-impossible-to-violate "reasonably effective
assistance" standard in criminal cases).
138
See Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability
Cases, 16 L\w & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1992).
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See generally Perlin, supra note 5; Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 124; Perlin & Dorfman, supra
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mentally disabled criminal defendants, to treat them more like other defendants, to
neither infantilize nor demonize them, 140 and to decline to focus solely on their
mental disability in construing their criminal process trial rights.
That this, however, may be little more than a trompe d'oeil illusion begins to
become apparent as one contextualizes the public reaction to the Ferguson trial.
First, Ferguson's initial set of lawyers fell all over themselves in an effort to make
Ferguson appear as mentally disabled as possible: "A delusional psychotic,"
declared Ronald Kuby, Kunstler's associate; 141 a "raving maniac," chimed in
Kunstler; 142 a "deranged man with a crazy defense," again from Kuby. 143 Colin
Moore, a black activist attorney who had represented Ferguson on another matter,
called the trial a "ritualistic sacrifice." 144 And a prominent columnist characterized
Ferguson as "nutty as peanut brittle. " 145 The irony was noted by a Washington Post
commentator:
The Fergiison trial has the lawyer-hating masses clamoring for-you guessed ita real lawyer. Suddenly, lawyers are agents of rationality and justice." 146
Other lawyers raised the question of fundamental fairness in other ways. Said Jack
Litman, "As horrific as the crimes are, when people see someone battling for himself
and he doesn't know how to do it, they feel this isn't fair. " 147 Leon Friedman honed in
on what he saw as Judge Belfi's failure to inquire into Ferguson's ability to knowingly
and intelligently waive counsel. 148 Professor Burt Neuborne focused on the
community's need for an "imprimatur of guilt": "It was important for everyone to
~a_y 'You did something terrible,' and they want to be sure Ferguson never gets out of
Jail. It served an important social purpose. But that is not the purpose of a trial. " 149
And while the trial had its "moments of catharsis for survivors," it left a "nasty,
hollow feeling in its wake." 150 Jan Hoffman's analysis for the New York Times rings
the most true:
Judge Belfi's ruling addressed a broader social need as well. Since 1981, when
of
both the insanity defense and a defendant's being found continually unfit to
stand trial. People are concerned that such defendants will somehow unjustly
elude conviction and punishment, and that terrible crimes will never be brought
to closure.1s1

John Hinckley shot President Reagan, the public has grown weary and fearful

140

Pe_rlin, supra note 125.
Nrghtline (ABC News television broadcast, Feb. IO, 1995), Transcript 3580.
l]; Associated Press, LIRR Shooting Suspect Rejects Insanity Defense; Contends That Court Wants to Cover
th e Facts, BERGEN (NJ) RECORD, Aug. 20, 1994, at A4.
1
144 Bruce Frankel, NY Rail Suspect Will Represent Self in Court, USA TODAY, Jan. 17, 1995, at 2A.
Alyson Alert, United States: Lawyer/Killer Tests Rules for Mental Competence, InterPress Service, Nov.
141

142

l

2

19_94..
Otts Pike, Insane Policy, NEW ORLEANS TlMEs-PICAYllNE, Feb. 23, 1_995, ~t B7.
F Letter From a Different Trial: Raising the Images of Lawyers By Proceeding Without Them, WASH. POST,
14~b. 3, 1995, at A2.
148 Jan ~offman, Lingering Emptiness, N.Y. TlMEs, Feb. 18. 1995, at 26.
Marilyn Goldstein, LIRR Case a "Catch22" in Reverse, Newsday (Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Feb. 3,
19 95, at AB (characterizing Belfi's decision as "a mistake").
·
149
1so lHoffman, supra note 147, at 26.
d.
ISi Id.
14;'
146

80

M. L. Perlin

By the time the trial was over, some observers shifted their original perspective on
Ferguson. Said the widow of one victim who originally assumed Ferguson was
insane ("because I couldn't believe any human being could actually do this"),
"There is no doubt now that he is sane; . . . a very calculating, manipulating
person." 152
The Ferguson trial, in summary, concluded with the same sort of stereotypical
constructions of mentally disabled criminal defendants as have most of the other
important cases to draw media attention since the trial of John W. Hinckley.

V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to discuss the Ferguson trial-"one of the most bizarre cases in court
history" 153-without invoking Hamlet: Is Justice Thomas hoisted by his own petard?
Godinez rejected the argument that an assessment of competence for counsel-waiver
purposes need be more searching or detailed than one for ability-to-stand-trial
purposes. This rejection resulted, ultimately, in the affirmance of the defendant
Moran's conviction in that case, 154 a "victory" for the state of Nevada (where
Moran's crimes were committed) and the United States Department ofJustice (that
shared argument on the Supreme Court level with the state). 155 It is beyond
argument that one of the hoped-for results of a prosecutorial victory would be an
increase in the number of convictions (and a concomitant decrease in the number of
appellate reversals) in cases involving defendants of questionable competence. 156
And the denouement of Colin Ferguson's case was precisely such a result. Richard
Moran's original guilty plea attracted no national attention. The Supreme Court's
decision in Godinez attracted little. The Ferguson case was a media circus. The
heuristic of the vivid case 157 quickly educated the media and the American public
about the broad outlines of the Godinez rationale (although few of the thousands of
press stories about Ferguson made the explicit link between that case and the
Godinez decision). For better or worse, just as the Hinckley case drove the insanity
"reform" debate of the early 1980's, 158 so will the Colin Ferguson case drive
whatever debate develops over competence questions in the late 1990's. 159
152 John T. McQuiston, Reporter's Notebook: Views Shift on.Insanity in Killings on L.1.R.R., N.Y. TIMEs,
Feb. 12, 1995, at 42.
153
McQuiston, supra note 88.
154 On remand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of Moran's habeas petition, finding that
his guilty plea entry was voluntary and intelligent. Moran v. Godinez, 40 F. 3d 1567 (9th Cir. 1994),
amended on denial of rehearing, 1994 WL 805772 (9th Cir. 1994), but see id., 40 F. 3d at 1577 (Pregerson,
J., dissenting).
155 See 1993 WL 751849 (transcript of oral argument in Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993)).
156 In 1992, the Supreme Court had ruled in Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992), that it was
not unconstitutional to place the burden of proof at an incompetency to stand trial hearing on the
defendant. Thus, if the scales are equally balanced between competence and incompetency, cases may
proceed to trial.
157
See e.g., Perlin, supra note 123; Perlin, supra note 124, Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 124.
158
PERLIN, supra note 15. ·
159
Beyond the scope of this paper is an inquiry into an irony that seems never to have been considered in
the literature: the parallels between the post-Hinckley insanity defense "reform" debate (on whether the
affective/behavioral prong of the insanity defense should be jettisoned, leaving only a cognitive prong, see
id. at 17-27) and the inquiry posed here (as to whether a cognitive inquiry is sufficient in a competencewaiver case, or whether a functional standard must be met as well).

Godinez and Ferguson

81

Godinez is, at base, a cynical and meretricious decision. It is cynical because of its
sole focus on the cognitive aspects of the capacity determination and its profound
disinterest in the functional aspects. It is meretricious because it appears to simplify
and unify a complex area of the law; in reality, it simply makes it more likely-far
more likely-that more seriously mentally disabled criminal defendants will be
convicted and subsequently imprisoned. 160 It is also meretricious because, though it
appears to privilege autonomy in an almost libertarian.way, it actually exposes the
majority's deep contempt for mentally disabled criminal defendants and its utter
disinterest in the logical and likely results of the decision. 161 And this contempt
extends to a contempt to the victims of crimes such as those committed by
Ferguson.162
Reaction to the Ferguson trial exposes the pretextuality that provides. ·the
underpinning of the Godinez decision. Although public and media response did not
appear to be as overtly sanist as, say, typical responses to mitigating mental disability
evidence in death penalty cases 163 or federal judges' construction of such evidence
in their application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 164 the trial spectacle
remained profoundly sanist. 165 The appearance of justice is a component of a fair
trial; 166 that appearance was sadly lacking in Ferguson's trial.
Godinez, to be blunt, is a bad decision. It is also a cruel decision. Few onlookers
can quarrel with the ultimate verdict in the Ferguson case, but the steps along the
way did nothing more than strain justice and mock the Constitutional guarantees of
a fair trial. Dignity, indeed, was the first to leave.
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